Hello Tobias
I‘m sorry to hear that you were attacked. Hopefully you had a offline copy of your backups.
To protect yourself against such attacks, please use one of our immutable or airgapped backup storage options.
If implemented correctly, an attacker will not be able to delete your backups:
Immutable backup storage: https://helpcenter.veeam.com/docs/backu ... ml?ver=120
Airgapped backup media:
- offline tapes
- disconnected rotated disks
A third option:
- Veeam Cloud Cloud Connect provider with enabled insider protection
Best,
Fabian
I‘m sorry to hear that you were attacked. Hopefully you had a offline copy of your backups.
To protect yourself against such attacks, please use one of our immutable or airgapped backup storage options.
If implemented correctly, an attacker will not be able to delete your backups:
Immutable backup storage: https://helpcenter.veeam.com/docs/backu ... ml?ver=120
Airgapped backup media:
- offline tapes
- disconnected rotated disks
A third option:
- Veeam Cloud Cloud Connect provider with enabled insider protection
Make sure that the backup server is not joined to your production domain. Install the backup console on a management server which can only be access by selected users. Additionally enable MFA for every user who will use the backup console to connect to the backup server: https://helpcenter.veeam.com/docs/backu ... ml?ver=120I know the authentication is the first answer but the fact is that the veeam console was accessible to a domain user and somehow the attacker could impersonate this dedicate domain user to run the console.
Best,
Fabian
Statistics: Posted by Mildur — Apr 11, 2024 9:11 pm






